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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s triad, i.e. field, habitus and capital, the paper aims at unfolding the 
practice of participatory budgeting (PB) in one Sri Lankan urban council, which we have 
referred to as the “Costal Urban Council (CUC)”, and in this process explores how such 
practice is framed and constrained by the structural and relational aspects of various forms of 
capital. The PB practice in the CUC has failed to achieve its fundamental objective - public 
participation in a manner of equality, justice, and transparency, or at least best partial success 
in some areas such as rates collection. We have demonstrated how PB has become a practice 
of power and domination rather than a means of fostering political emancipation in the CUC. 
The field-specific organisation of various forms of capital has allowed the chairman of the 
CUC to become dominant and take control of the whole budgeting process and PB, which is 
aimed at impeding such political practices, has become dominated by the same political 
dynamics. We argue that PB in the specific field of less-developed countries can have far 
greater effects than simply revitalising local democracy, including providing personal gains 
and potentially posing a threat to democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims at unfolding the practice of participatory budgeting (PB) in one urban council 
(which we have referred to as the ‘Costal Urban Council (CUC)’ in order to preserve 
anonymity) in Sri Lanka, a less-developed country (LDC), and in this process explores how 
such a practice is framed and constrained by the structural and relational aspects of various 
forms of capital. Based on our knowledge, the CUC is one of the first local governments to 
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adopt the very notion of PB in Sri Lanka, and perhaps also in South Asia. Following the 
CUC’s endeavours, several other local authorities in the country have announced a 
transformation in their budgets leading to the adoption of PB (MLGPC, 2011). 
 
Implementation of PB in LDCs has become an important component of neoliberal reforms, 
which are termed as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) and, more recently, ‘New Public 
Governance’ (NPG) (Osborne, 2006; Uddin, Gumb & Kasumba, 2011). International 
monetary organisations such as the World Bank and other bilateral development agencies, for 
instance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, are involved in 
disseminating this form of budgeting in the local governments of LDCs with rhetoric, 
amongst others, democratising democracy, eradicating corruption and clientelism, and 
uplifting the quality of life of the most deprived (Slater, 1997; Speer, 2012; Uddin, Gumb & 
Kasumba, 2011). Researchers in public administration have envisaged PB as a central element 
in fostering the deliberate or participatory form of democracy (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006; 
Michels, 2011;  Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 2011). We observed two contrasting 
arguments, however, with regard to the importance of PB in the context of emerging and less-
developed countries (Cèlèrier and Botey, 2015). The first one envisages the emancipatory 
potential of PB in the democratisation of otherwise non-democratic, corrupted, or inefficient 
administrative settings. It has been claimed that PB will provide a space for marginalised 
groups of a society in the decision-making process, a key element for enhancing the 
grassroots democracy by making it more inclusive. The other view implies that the conditions 
for successful participation in the political field are not equally distributed amongst members 
of the public and therefore the implementation of PB may help normalise the domination of a 
particular group without any changes in the existing social inequalities (see Musso, Weare, 
Bryer & Cooper, 2011; Nyamori, Lawrence & Perera, 2012). This may result in the 
undermining of the emancipatory potential of PB in a field of grassroots politics. Implicit in 
both views is, however, the importance of considering field-specific logics ingrained in PB 
practices so as to understand the actual motives and outcomes of PB in emerging and less-
developed countries (see also Alawattage, 2011).  
 
We draw on Bourdieu’s triad, i.e. field, habitus and capital, to investigate the PB practice in 
the CUC and the structural logics of the field embedded in such practices. Accounting 
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researchers have deployed Bourdieu’s work in a range of areas, for instance, human rights 
(e.g. Cooper, Coulson & Taylor, 2011), accounting history (e.g. Ikin, Johns & Hayes, 2012; 
Xu and Xu, 2008), public sector accounting (e.g. Ahn, Jacobs, Li & Moon, 2014), auditing 
(e.g. Everett, 2003), management accounting (e.g. Goddard, 2004), accounting education (e.g. 
Everett, 2008), environmental accounting (e.g. Everett, 2004), business planning (e.g. Oakes, 
Townley & Cooper, 1998) and local government (e.g. Cèlèrier and Botey, 2015), amongst 
others. In the context of Sri Lanka, Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) have drawn on 
Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus, and capital to demonstrate how the power and politics 
related to resource allocation mechanisms continued to perpetuate poverty in a fishing village. 
In a similar vein, Alawattage (2011) has used the field-specific properties of habitus, doxa, 
bodily hexis, and capital to illustrate how calculative practices and the social structure of 
capital in the gem mining rituals in Sri Lanka are connected to each other. With some 
exceptions (see e.g. Cèlèrier and Botey, 2015), few studies have attempted to look at PB 
practices in the local government of LDCs using Bourdieu’s conceptions. Local governments 
provide an interesting research setting in that they are often reckoned to be battlefields where 
social actors, in particular politicians, are constantly competing with each other for various 
forms of capital so as to maintain or advance their positions and hierarchies. In such a context, 
accounting techniques such as PB can have the potential of being symbolic systems allowing 
these politicians to accumulate and redistribute various forms of capital and offering them the 
opportunity and capacity to exert domination, control and symbolic violence (see e.g. 
Alawattage, 2011; Farjaudon and Morales, 2013). Teasing out the real practice in the name of 
PB, this study contributes to Bourdieusian-based accounting work on LDCs. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines Bourdieu’s 
triad, i.e. field, habitus and capital, which has provided the theoretical setting for this study. 
The third section addresses our research method. The fourth section offers a brief overview of 
the Sri Lankan political system and the CUC. The fifth section, which provides our empirical 
findings, highlights the emergence of PB in Sri Lankan local government, the way the PB 
practice was structured, PB meetings and habitus, and the field-specific organisation of capital 
and the perpetuation of domination and symbolic violence. The final section analyses the 
implementation of PB in the CUC in the light of Bourdieu’s relational approach and offers 
some concluding remarks. 
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2. Bourdieu’s relational approach: Field, Habitus, and Capital 
 
Bourdieu mentions that the elements in his conceptual triad, i.e. field, capital and habitus, are 
indispensable (1996a) and their relationship has been formulated as ‘(habitus * capital) + field 
= practice’(1986a). It is discernible, however, that the extant accounting literature has drawn 
on either one or more of these elements and is subject to a common criticism for the failure to 
embed all three concepts or to balance their use into a single study (Ahn, Jacobs, Li &, Moon, 
2014; Cooper and Coulson, 2014; Everett 2004; Farjaudon and Morales, 2013; Hamilton and 
Ò hÒgartaigh, 2009; Malsch and Gendron, 2013; Neu, 2006). The piecemeal use of these 
elements is envisaged as a caveat and mentions are made that such attempts may lead to a 
misunderstanding of Bourdieu’s ‘relational approach’ (Alawattage, 2011). There is a scope in 
accounting research to exploit fully Bourdieu’s relational approach. Examining the PB 
practice in the Sri Lankan urban council, we therefore intend to fill this gap in the accounting 
literature. 
 
Field  
 
Bourdieu (1990; 1992a; 1996a) has conceptualised all social spaces in which various agents 
(i.e. economic, political, cultural, educational, etc.) interact as fields. Each field or narrower 
field within a particular field (for instance, linguistic within the cultural field) is a structured 
space which encompasses structural logics, and is determined by the relations between the 
positions that social actors occupy (Xu and Xu, 2008; Ikin , Johns & Hayes, 2012). Actors 
within a particular field possess a specific position, i.e. dominant or dominated, based on the 
volume of various forms of capital and the relative weight of each of these forms that they 
occupy (Bourdieu, 1986b; 1990; 1992a). It is evident that much of the accounting work based 
on Bourdieu’s concept of the field has striven to investigate the use and reproduction of 
various forms of capital and the way such forms are implicated in the selected accounting 
phenomena (for field-specific studies see e.g. Everett, 2008; Alawattage, 2011; Neu, 2006).  
 
For the purpose of this study, we have considered the CUC (i.e. our research setting) a 
political field where continuous struggle between local politicians representing the country’s 
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two biggest parties, i.e. the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), for power and domination is striking. Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) state 
that such political struggles in the actual processes of resource allocation are ubiquitous in 
postcolonial Sri Lankan local politics. It has become an institutionalised practice among local 
politicians to channel certain resources to their voters by mobilising various field-specific 
strategies. Bourdieu (1986a, 1993a, 1996b) mentions that struggles amongst social actors for 
specific stakes, resources, and interests are, however, essential for the existence and operation 
of a field. In this view, it is common for social actors to be involved in the construction of 
field-specific strategies and to strive to maintain dominant relationships over others, even 
though such behaviour is likely to entail an antagonistic response from other participants in 
the field. Calculative practices and templates, for instance, the PB practices, may evolve as an 
important component of such strategies enabling the social actors to conserve or subvert the 
existing structure of the distribution of the forms of capital, the accumulation of which is 
crucial to perpetuate their political interests in the field (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1996b; Bourdieu 
and Wacquannt, 1992; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011; Alawattage, 2011).  
 
Habitus 
 
Bourdieu (1992b) has implied the term habitus to refer to the learned or internal dispositions 
of social actors which determine their objective behaviour in a field. Habitus is a product of 
history and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by reactivation in similarly structured 
behaviours and practices (Ikin, Johns & Hayes, 2012; Xu and Xu, 2008). Bourdieu (1977; 
1986a; 1992b; 1993a; 1996a) mentions that the habitus represents both a structured structure 
and a structuring structure. As the structured structure, actors’ formal education, family 
background, socialisation, previous experiences, and understanding of behaviour are 
embodied in their body and mind leading them to reproduce certain behaviours and practices 
in the field unconsciously (see e.g. Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). In this regard, the 
habitus can be a cause for setting structural limits and legitimatising the material and 
symbolic inequalities by providing taken-for-granted acceptance to certain practices 
(Alawattage, 2011). The habitus is also a structuring structure in that the actors using their 
previous embodied experiences tend to shape and modify their present and future behaviours 
and practices (see e.g. Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011).  
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Based on Bourdieu’s relational approach, the existence and operation of the field and habitus 
are in compliance with each other. Changes in the field result in more or less reflexive long-
term changes in the habitus (see e.g. Malsch and Gendron, 2013). In a similar vein, the 
habitus enables social actors to anticipate the requirements of the field and develop field-
specific strategies consistent with their material and symbolic interests, which is also evident 
in prior work. For instance, the study by Malsch and Gendron (2013) has illustrated how some 
selected large accounting firms stepped outside the boundaries of the profession (i.e. field) in 
search of additional agents and capital, and how they were able to maintain their institutional 
domination by changing some of the rules of the game (i.e. habitus). In a similar vein, 
Goddard (2004) has drawn on the notion of habitus to explain how perceptions of 
accountability have been constructed in local government (field) in the UK and the impacts 
such perceptions have in articulating budget practices. We have in our study understood 
habitus as a mode of embodiments of the structural and relational properties of the CUC, 
manifesting the PB practice and the agency of social actors, particularly the politicians.  
 
Capital 
 
Social actors’ positons in the field are determined by the volume and composition of capital 
that they possess (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). Struggles amongst the social 
actors to accumulate various forms of capital in the field are therefore ubiquitous. Swartz 
(1997, p. 73) states that in such struggles capital often becomes a ‘social relation of power’. 
The capital available to the social actors has been conceptualised into four categories/forms, 
i.e. economic, social, cultural, and symbolic (see e.g. Bourdieu, 1986a; 1986b; 1990; 1992a). 
One form of capital can be converted to another and such conversions are important for the 
reproduction of other forms/categories of capital and establishing a monopoly over the means 
of capital creation and accumulation (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986b; 1990; Everett, 2004; Farjaudon 
and Morales, 2013; Xu and Xu, 2008).  
 
Economic capital is most easily recognised in the form of property rights and is immediately 
converted into money. This form of capital is of utmost important for social actors’ success 
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and survival in all types of fields (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986a; 1986b; 1992a). Cultural capital, 
which refers to various kinds of cultural knowledge, competence, and disposition, exists in 
three forms of states, i.e. embodied, objectified, and institutionalised. The embodied state 
refers to tacit knowledge and skills that prevail in social actors’ bodies and minds. The 
objectified state relates to physically available items such as historical artefacts and objects. 
The institutionalised state represents formal educational qualifications and competence. 
Cèlèrier and Botey (2015) state that cultural capital has been privileged in many of 
Bourdieu’s studies to elucidate the process of reproducing dominant patters through the 
exploitation of habitus. Social capital embeds resources that can be potentially or actually 
accessible due to the existence of a long-lasting network of more or less established 
relationships as a member of a particular group (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1986b). Several researchers 
have in their studies attempted to draw a distinction between two subforms of social capital, 
namely bridging (i.e. structural or linkage capital) and bonding (i.e. relational, integration, or 
closure capital) (Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2010; Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 2011; 
Nyamori, Lawrence & Perera,  2012). According to Chenhall, Hall & Smith (2010: 740), 
while bridging social capital is ‘the quantum of ties and the structure of the network of the 
relations as a whole’, bonding capital refers to ‘the quality of social ties in terms of the extent 
to which values are shared’.  
 
Symbolic capital refers to the ‘degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration, or 
honour’, all of which are constructed on a dialectic of knowledge and recognition (Bourdieu, 
1993b, p.7). This form of capital provides the reasons for the existence of power-position 
relations, social hierarchies and inequalities, and domination and symbolic violence in the 
field. The possession of symbolic capital allows social actors to gain symbolic or invisible 
power, which can be mobilised with the complicity of the dominated being unaware of being 
subject to it (Bourdieu, 1992a). The dominated may continue to participate in the pursuit of a 
dominant vision of a particular field, a situation which has been termed ‘doxa’ (Bourdieu, 
1986a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; Alawattage, 2011), either unconsciously or in a belief that they 
are pursuing their own interests (Farjaudon and Morales, 2013; Célérier and Botey, 2015). 
They ingrain the illusio, i.e. the idea that the game is worth playing and taken seriously 
(Bourdieu, 1992b; 1996b; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Alawattage, 2011). Such a 
misrecognised perpetuation of domination in which the dominated contribute has been 
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understood as ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu, 1990; 1992a; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; 
Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998; Everett, 2003; Cooper, Coulson & Taylor, 2011).  
 
Accounting researchers have illustrated how accounting templates and practices can become a 
system of symbolic violence, maintaining social hierarchies and inequalities in a particular 
context. For instance, Oakes, Townley & Cooper (1998) have demonstrated how accountants 
and auditors have perpetuated symbolic violence by controlling the naming of a fundamental 
accounting construct, for instance, ‘true and fair view’. In a similar vein, Everett (2004) has 
discussed the attempts of social actors to accumulate symbolic capital by offering up the 
‘linguistic market’ language that is sought after, for instance, corporate environmental reports. 
In their study of accounting for human rights based on an in-depth analysis of an industrial 
disaster, which occurred at the ICL plastic plant in 2004, Cooper, Coulson & Taylor (2011) 
have unfolded the underlying objective structure of symbolic violence framing the subjective 
health and safety expectations of workers in ICL. Such assertions lead to the idea that 
symbolic capital can have a dominant role in the political field of LDCs, for instance, the 
CUC in our case, which is often characterised as a contesting site for power, domination, and 
violence (see also Alawattage, 2011; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). 
 
The foregoing discussion of Bourdieu’s relational approach has been used to analyse the 
adoption and implementation of the PB practice in a Sri Lankan urban council. In the 
empirical sections, after the methodology, we will discuss the field (i.e. the CUC) in which 
the PB practice has been introduced. We will then analyse the subtle dialectic connection 
between the PB practice and the conditions that articulate and reproduce such practices (i.e. 
habitus and capital). In doing so we will bring out the peculiarities of PB practice through 
field-specific dynamics (i.e. structural, relational, and cognitive logics of the field in terms of 
capital and habitus).   
 
3. Research method 
 
This is a case study drawing on semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and field 
observation. Although there was no research grant available for the study, we had been 
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interested for some time in exploring how the PB practice was being implemented in the 
CUC, one of the first urban councils to embrace this type of budgeting in the entire region, not 
least in the country. One of the co-authors made an initial visit to the CUC with a view to 
gaining a preliminary insight into the PB process there. Along with collecting the budget and 
accounting statements of the council from the previous few years, and some documents issued 
by the Ministry of Local Government and Provincial Council (MLGPC), the visit was also 
used to hold discussions with nine members of staff and two politicians, including the 
Chairman of the CUC (see Appendix A). The co-author encouraged the participants to freely 
pinpoint any issues relating to PB that they believed were relevant to our study. All interviews 
were tape-recorded, and notes were taken of the important issues that emerged during the 
discussions, and were subsequently transcribed with the assistance of another co-author. The 
involvement of Sri Lankan colleagues in this respect enabled us to ensure the avoidance of 
mistranslation from the native language into English, which we maintained throughout the 
process of transcribing interviews.    
 
The visit’s findings were discussed amongst a group of six researchers, which represented 
five of Sri Lankan origin and one non-native. Two of the five Sri Lankan researchers had 
lived very close to the CUC’s administrative area and were aware of the accounting and 
budgeting practices prevailing in Sri Lankan local governments. One of them had worked as 
an investigation officer at the department of local government, responsible for overseeing 
accounts of the local governments, while the other person had been a resource person in the 
workshops for the officers of the aforementioned department. As stated in ethnographic 
research (Alawattage 2011), we had therefore generated meaningful narratives of the field-
specific properties of the habitus and capital internalised by the politicians and citizens and 
implicated in the budget procedures and practices. The initial round’s findings and the work 
experience of two co-authors further enabled us to comprehend an existing political struggle 
in the space of the grassroots level for various forms of capital and the manners in which these 
various forms had been implicated in the structuring of PB meetings and practices.  
 
Having discussed the findings of our initial interviews and document search, we then sorted 
out the issues that should be further investigated and scheduled the second stage of interviews. 
Also, we discussed the importance of giving assurance to the administrators that our findings 
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would be presented in such a way as to provide anonymity. This was very important because 
of the political sensitivity of our study. In July 2012, two co-authors (see Appendix B) carried 
out another 11 semi-structured interviews with the chairman, members of staff, and politicians 
(see Appendix A). All interviews were held in the native Sri Lankan language and transcribed 
immediately into English. While the interviews started off in a similar way to the previous 
stage, i.e. as a free-flowing conversation, we attempted to be more specific at this stage, 
raising with the participants several questions relating to the new budgeting approach in more 
detail. In particular, we asked them about the political context of the CUC; the importance of 
PB and the process used in its development; the participation of local residents, councillors, 
and administrators in the budget meetings; the procedures for selecting programme(s)/projects 
in the budget and getting them approved at council meetings; and the impact that the PB 
practice had on local politics. 
 
The third stage of the field work involved observations of the CUC’s council meetings in 
December 2012. A group of three co-authors (see Appendix B) were physically present at the 
CUC to conduct interviews and were also able to attend the budget meetings at which the 
budget for the 2013 fiscal year was approved. The authors enjoyed various staff facilities, 
including lunchtime talks with the administrators in the canteen, on each visit. Discussions 
were also held with the chairman and seven administrators, including the vice-chairman and 
two elected members, which helped resolve many issues relating to PB that had previously 
remained unclear. The informal gatherings and conversations with staff members in the 
canteen also proved valuable for allowing the co-authors to perceive the general feelings and 
personal motives behind the adoption of PB in the CUC. Nevertheless, the research group 
conceded that they had not been able to have a discussion with the opposition leader of the 
CUC, who had the potential to be a very important source of data having been a member of 
the CUC since the 1980s. Accordingly, this person was interviewed in July 2014. One of the 
co-authors made contact and conducted the interview, whilst the first author and another co-
author (see Appendix B) were available over Skype to pose additional questions in 
accordance with emerging themes. 
 
In total, we were able to undertake 31 interviews with 13 informants over a period of three 
years. The chairman of the CUC was interviewed three times, each interview lasting from two 
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to four hours. The discussions with the vice-chairman, other elected members, and 
administrative and clerical staff members lasted between one and two hours. Several of the 
respondents were interviewed on more than one occasion (see Appendix A), because of their 
roles and involvement in facilitating PB. Given the sensitivity of some of the issues revealed 
by the administrative and other staff members, we have taken care not to disclose their 
identities. The fact that some of the interviewees were interviewed several times allowed us to 
ensure the reliability and validity of their earlier statements. Furthermore, as explained by 
Chenhall, Hall & Smith (2010), the presence of at least two authors at the second, third and 
fourth stages of our field work proved valuable, not only for maintaining the continuity of the 
conversation with the respondents but also for building confidence about our findings. At the 
end of the process, we arranged our data, gathered through the above-mentioned different 
phases, chronologically and identified key events and issues in the CUC’s implementation of 
PB. We then interpreted these events and issues using the prism of Bourdieu’s field, habitus, 
and capital so as to generate an understanding of the subtle dialectical connection between the 
PB practice and the conditions that reproduce such practices (habitus and capital). 
 
4. The political context of Sri Lanka and the CUC  
  
4.1. Overall political system in the country 
 
The country’s politics have been a battlefield for two main political parties, namely the United 
National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), since its independence from 
Britain in 1948 (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). The political power of a Westminster 
type of parliament and local governments, which the country inherited from the UK due to its 
colonial legacy, has been dominated either by the UNP-headed alliance or by the SLFP and its 
coalition throughout the postcolonial era. The political leaders of both parties had used the 
slogan of political emancipation from the colonial administration to attract the natives’ loyalty 
and political support (Jayawardena, 2000; Warnapala, 2001). However, these two parties had 
propagated and adhered to different ideology to articulate such emancipation. While the UNP 
had promoted the private sector-driven economy, the SLFP had pursued state-centred 
economic policies.  
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Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) state that a key feature of Sri Lankan local politics 
has been a constant struggle between politicians of these two main parties to monopolise 
resources and channel them into their specific jurisdictions so as to strengthen their political 
position and domination. The politicians of both parties had in the past emphasised the need 
for strengthening the executive wing of the government and were involved in curtailing 
bureaucratic independence, although they had adhered to different approaches in achieving 
this goal (see Warnapala, 1973a; Wilson, 1968). As part of strengthening the dominance of 
the executive level in the political arena, the SLFP’s alliance in 1972 announced amendments 
in the constitution. Key changes that were introduced included the abolishment of the Public 
Service Commission and the transfer of power to the Cabinet of Ministers to appoint, 
promote, transfer, and undertake disciplinary action over the bureaucracy (Perera, 1998; 
Warnapala 1973b). In 1978, the UNP-headed alliance made another amendment in the 
constitution by incorporating a provision for electing an executive president. The president 
was declared as the head of state, the executive of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces with unlimited power over the country’s politics and 
governance.  
 
The constitutional change, which contributed to the introduction of an executive president 
system, had triggered a major shift in the national electoral system. A system of district 
preferential voting was then brought forth in practice, abandoning the constituency-based 
electoral system (Kearney, 1983). This shift in the electoral system had a profound impact on 
local politics which is evident even today. Because of this change, members of parliament 
now have to launch very expensive political campaigns covering their whole district. They are 
therefore constantly in search for the measures and resources important for their survival in 
the political field. Despite the consolidation of power at the centre, however, youth unrest in 
the south and the ethnic problem in the north led the government to embark on a policy of 
decentralising its power in the 1980s. The Provincial Council system was identified as a 
viable solution to remedy the enduring ethnic conflicts as well as to represent multi-ethnic Sri 
Lankan societies (Matthews, 1982). The system, which was put in place through the thirteenth 
amendment to the constitution and through the passing of the Provincial Council Bill in 
October 1987, devolved a significant portion of the central government’s function to the 
provincial councils (see e.g. Shastri, 1992; Bandaranayake, 1989; Slater, 1997). The local 
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government bodies, i.e. municipal councils, urban councils, and pradeshiya sabhas, 
representing each province were brought under the wings of the provincial councils. The 
provincial councils were made responsible for supervising and monitoring the financial and 
operational management of the local governments in their administrative area. This 
devolution of power certainly had an impact on escalating the struggle between the UNP and 
the SLFP in terms of maintaining domination at all levels in local government. In addition, it 
triggered political conflicts amongst the politicians representing the same political party. 
Many of the grassroots politicians aspired to become an elected member of a provincial 
council after becoming a leading politician of a local government. The CUC, our research 
setting, serves as one example in this regard.  
 
4.2. Overview of the CUC 
  
The history of the present Sri Lankan local government bodies, including urban councils, 
dates back to the country’s colonial era. Having gained total control over the island in 1815, 
the British brought about a change in the country’s administrative system that had been 
founded by the Dutch, who had ruled from 1640 (de Silva, 2006). As part of this change, three 
municipal councils were established in Colombo, Kandy, and Galle, the three major cities of 
the island, and local boards and sanitary boards were inaugurated respectively in the smaller 
towns and villages (Bandaranayake, 1989; de Silva, 2006; Unamboowa, 1989). As was the 
case in other colonies (de Silva, 2006), the colonial administrators put a particular focus on 
local authorities, not only to reinforce their control on the island but also to encourage the 
agriculture-based economies to flourish so that they could exploit local resources. As part of 
reinforcing control, the society was stratified based on people’s castes, social positions, and 
political patronage and by privileging one group while marginalising other groups 
(Jayawardena, 2000; Warnapala, 2001; Wijeweera, 1989). It has been claimed that the 
impacts of such social divisions, domination, and patronage politics that prevailed during the 
colonial era have had a profound impact in the construction of social structures and the 
habitus of local actors/politicians and their agency (Alawattage, 2011; Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2008; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011; Wickramasinghe and 
Hopper, 2005). As stated by Bourdieu (1977; 1986b), such structures and habitus have been a 
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guiding principle even today for these local actors/politicians to cognise, communicate, and 
reproduce their day-to-day practices. 
 
At present, the island’s local authorities consist of 18 municipal councils, 42 urban councils, 
and 270 pradeshiya sabhas, which correspond, respectively, to the main cities, the towns, and 
the rural areas. The CUC – our research setting (the field) – started out as a sanitary board at 
the beginning of the 20th century and was gradually transformed into an urban council after 
the issuance of the Urban Council Ordinance No. 61 in 1939. The CUC was formally 
inaugurated a year later in 1940. All public representatives of this council have been elected 
as per the ward-based election system since 1945. Nevertheless, as a result of 1978’s 
constitutional change, the grassroots politicians are elected on the basis of a proportional 
representation system. The amendment made to the Urban Council Ordinance in 1988 had 
designated the chairman of all urban councils as chief executive officers and the secretaries as 
chief administrative officers, delegating more authority to them in their jurisdictions’ 
decision-making and resource allocation processes. The UNP remained the dominant power 
in the CUC for 27 years, from 1970 until 1997. In the 1997 election, it was replaced by the 
SLFP, and the incumbent chairman representing the SLFP became the chairman of the CUC 
for the first time. The SLFP then lost the council election of 2002, which put the chairman out 
of power for four years. Since the election of 2006, both the chairman and his party (SLFP) 
have consistently ruled the council. The council is represented by 12 elected members, of 
whom 8 are members of the SLFP and the remaining 4 members of the UNP. 
 
Geographically, the CUC’s administrative area covers around 7 square kilometres, stretching 
across the southern coast of the island and consisting of 13 administrative zones (wards). It is 
estimated that approximately 24,156 inhabitants currently reside within the jurisdiction of the 
CUC, of whom 16,879 are eligible to vote. The total budget of the council for the financial 
year of 2014 was around 200 million rupees. Recurrent expenditure constitutes about 56.2% 
of the total budget while the remaining balance is of a capital nature. The CUC currently 
receives annual grants from the central government as provisions of the decentralised budget, 
which primarily cover the salaries of its permanent staff members and the elected councillors. 
Such state grants represent 32.5% of the council’s targeted income. It also secures annual 
grants from the provincial council and from NGOs, the amounts of which vary each year 
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based on negotiations. It is anticipated that the bulk of the council’s revenue (approximately 
58.38% of the total income) in 2014 will be generated from recurring sources, i.e. charges for 
a variety of services offered to the local community, rents from shops and market spaces, and 
rates from 8,891 properties.  
 
5. Empirical findings: Participatory budgeting in the CUC 
 
This section begins by discussing how the ideas of PB evolved in Sri Lankan local 
governments. We then address the structural and relational conditions for PB in the CUC. In 
particular, we demonstrate the way the PB practice was organised and structured in the CUC, 
the PB meetings and embedded habitus and dispositions of the politicians and citizens, and 
the field-specific organisations of various forms of capital and the perpetuation of domination 
and symbolic violence in the name of PB.  
  
5.1. PB in Sri Lankan local governments 
 
Empowering the public and making local services more responsive to their needs has not been 
a new agenda in Sri Lankan local politics. Although the country adopted programme 
budgeting at its central level in the early 1970s, budget and resource allocation mechanisms at 
local levels remained largely the prerogatives of the chairman and the elected members. Local 
politicians had drawn criticism for being reluctant to get inhabitants involved in deciding 
matters that had direct impacts on their well-being (Kulasekara, 1986; Local Government 
Circular No. 3 of 2005; MLGPC, 2008b; 2009a; 2009b; 2011; RCILGR, 1999; Slater, 1997; 
World Bank, 1985). Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2011) mention that there was a 
‘discursive shift’ in the World Bank’s development strategies to the country at the beginning 
of the 1990s, calling for a more community-driven and participative approach to governance 
at local levels. In particular, the Bank had emphasised the importance of introducing 
accounting practices to mitigate the political patronage and clientelism in allocating resources 
in its poverty alleviation and grassroots development projects. 
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Despite such concerns over involving the rural poor in the budget, the latter continued to 
perform as a tool for local politicians to strengthen their position in their respective political 
fields and to maintain their social recognition (i.e. as a leader), which Bourdieu has termed 
‘symbolic capital’. As evident by the island’s constitutional and public sector reforms, the 
elected politicians had intended to maintain or strengthen the patron-client relationship (see 
e.g. Wijeweera, 1989). In its report, the Commission of Inquiry on Local Government 
Reforms (RCILGR) (1999) had pinpointed the provisions of the island’s Urban Council 
Ordinance as a key cause allowing local politicians to allocate budget based on their personal 
interests and party politics and mobilise it more for the purpose of control and domination. 
The provisions had, for instance, granted the chairman a prerogative to endorse the budget or 
a supplementary estimate if it was rejected twice consecutively by the majority of elected 
councillors. Notably, such concerns over the authoritarian behaviour of the chairman in the 
budget process and the adverse impacts it had on local governance had also been echoed by 
the Urban Programme Unit of the MLGPC (Kuruppu, 1989). This unit had in its proposal 
submitted to the MLGPC in the late 1980s urged to curtail the dominating logics and practices 
of the councils’ chairmen in some areas and promote the electorate’s participation in the local 
government’s budgeting process. For instance, one recommendation was concerned with 
establishing a rates payers’ association in each administrative zone and delegating to the 
association the authority to decide on the taxes within its jurisdiction (Kulasekara, 1986).  
 
Apparently, it was only after the launch of the ‘Transparent Accountable Local Governance 
Programme (TALGP)’ in 2005, that PB had drawn the attention of the country’s local 
authorities. The programme, which was a collaborative effort between the MLGPC and the 
Asia Foundation and continued for two years with the financial support of the USAID, 
resulted in the issuance of guidelines for the introduction of PB. In addition to this, officials 
from 35 local authorities (the CUC was not represented) were provided with training on 
various aspects of PB and the ways to involve citizens in the budget process and address their 
concerns. In 2008, the MLGPC (see 2008a; 2008b) also published two handbooks entitled 
‘Local Authorities Budget and Local Governance Reform’ and ‘Local Governance and 
Citizens’ Participation’, encouraging local authorities to embrace PB as part of fostering local 
governance. Central to these reports was the emphasis on holding community meetings in 
each zone, which was envisaged as indispensable to encourage citizens’ participation. 
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The issuance of the first national policy on local governments in 2009 had apparently 
provided further impetus for local governments to initiate a step towards adopting PB. Of the 
several strategies outlined in the policy for improving local governance, PB was given a top 
priority. In the case of the CUC, the enactment of the Local Authorities Act Number 21 in 
2012 had apparently become a key stimulus for PB. This act has curtailed some of the budget 
authorities of the chairmen of urban councils and mayors in that they will be automatically 
ousted whenever a budget or supplementary budget is disapproved by the majority of council 
members at two consecutive hearings. All these initiatives envisage a desire of the central 
government to provide marginalised inhabitants political emancipation and to avoid them 
being subject to domination and violence, which the local politicians had exercised through 
the traditional budgeting process.  
 
5.2.Structured budgeting process of the CUC 
 
Local governance in Sri Lanka has traditionally been centred on the budget. The budget has 
remained a key instrument through which to cognise and communicate the day-to-day work 
practices and maintain positions. The dominant role that the local politicians have been 
playing in the budget process illustrates this. The budget process in Sri Lankan local levels, 
including urban councils, commences after the Commissioner of Local Governments at the 
Provincial Council issues budget guidelines at the beginning of April. Having received the 
guidelines, the chairman of urban councils issues instructions to the accounting department to 
provide estimates of recurrent expenditures and revenues for the entire council by the end of 
June. The administrative heads of each section estimate recurrent expenditures and revenues 
for their section and forward it to their accounting department where the estimates of all 
sections are consolidated prior to their submission to the chairman. The elected councillors 
representing specific zones in a council are acting as the eyes and ears of their party 
supporters (Wijeweera, 1989). They are involved in providing suggestions of development 
projects that are to be included in the budget. At the next stage, the accounting department 
prepares a preliminary budget for the council as a whole compiling all project proposals and 
recurrent estimations for the following year and forwards it to the chairman at the beginning 
of August. The role of the chairman at this stage is to scrutinise all estimates and decide on 
the projects and programmes that are to be included in the budget. By the end of August, the 
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chairman presents the budget proposal in the council for further discussion and its subsequent 
approval. The councillors have a say during the discussion and can also propose amendments 
to budget estimates and the projects selected, the decision of which is however based on the 
chairman. The budget is usually approved by the council during the second or third reading in 
December and the final budget is published on or before 31st December. 
 
Despite the concerns over citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process, Slater (1997) 
claims that the country’s grassroots politicians have been unwilling to relinquish their grip 
over decision-making with respect to the specific zone that they represent. The budget 
processes in the island’s urban councils have therefore appeared more as a rule of the game 
and a taken-for-granted scheme of perception produced by social structures, similar to what 
Bourdieu has termed ‘the doxa’ (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b). For politicians, the 
budget has become a means of monopolising the available capital and its sources so that they 
can produce positional asymmetries, inequalities, and hierarchies, elements which are crucial 
to perpetuate their political career. The citizens have inculcated the routine of budget practice 
in that it has enabled them to access and approach local politicians for various social and 
personal issues. During our interview, we were told that the citizens not only tend to seek the 
assistance of the council representatives in getting their projects approved in the budget but 
also in resolving other personal issues, for example, getting admission for their child to a 
leading school in the administrative are of the CUC. An administrator of the CUC, who has 
several years of experience working in local governments remarked: 
In our local governance, whenever the citizens encounter a problem, a grassroots politician 
representing the political party that they support would be the first one to be contacted and 
sought assistance. 
 
Mentions are made that the perpetuation of such a situation of dependency implicated in the 
budget has allowed the local politicians to maintain their political dominance in every 
possible issue in the society (Wijeweera, 1989). The CUC, our research site, has not been an 
exception to such a budget process and political dependency. As is the case of other urban 
councils, the chairman and elected councillors of the CUC had for many years drawn criticism 
for their attempt at privileging party loyalists while marginalising the majority of the citizens’ 
needs in budget allocation (MLGPC, 2007; 2008a; 2009a; 2009b; RCILGR, 1999). The 
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elected councils of the CUC were involved in proposing activities/projects for their respective 
zones and the chairman had the prerogative to select some of those projects based on the 
available resources. On the whole, the chairman was the dominant figure in the entire budget 
process and the allocation of resources. The citizens had embodied the dominating budget 
routines and structures and their political dependency perpetuated as a disposition and taken-
for-granted habitus. During our interviews we observed that this logic of dependency was still 
prevalent in the CUC in many ways. The opposition leader of the CUC who had been an 
elected member of the council consistently since 1983 remarked:  
As far as I understand, an urban council has the duty of fulfilling public needs, and the public 
keep the elected representative informed about their needs. This is what has happened since 
the inauguration of a local government system in the country. I, as their representative, will 
do my best to convince the council to provide solutions for their grievances and to help them. 
They know this very well and they keep me aware of their requirements.  
 
This pattern of allocating resources and the budget procedures altered after the SLFP won the 
council election in 2006. The same chairman who was ousted by the UNP candidate in the 
election of 2002 was re-elected as the council’s chairman. The incumbent chairman of the 
CUC, who represents the SLFP and has been serving the council since the election of 2006, 
has been ostensibly aware of the importance of the field-specific organisation and distribution 
of various forms of capital in sustaining and advancing his political career. His background as 
a lawyer means that he is one of the few highly educated politicians involved in the country’s 
local politics. In that sense, he has inherited the capacity of exploiting the benefits of cultural 
and other forms of capital available to him in realising his personal interests as compared to 
many other local politicians lacking such capital. The budget served him with both a 
communicative and legitimatising device by which he could propagate political changes of 
democratisation and emancipation, and achieve his vested interests (i.e. a prolonged political 
career).  
 
In 2007, a new budget procedure was proposed and approved in the CUC’s council meeting 
requiring the elected politicians of each administrative zone to consult the local community 
prior to submitting their project and programme proposals to the council. Based on the 
regulations, the elected councillors together with the administrators should organise 
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community meetings in their respective zones during May and June and provide the 
inhabitants with the opportunity to publicly express their needs and propose and rank the 
projects and programmes that they consider important in their zones. The regulation also 
stated that the citizens should be provided with prior information of the community meetings 
through the available advertising mechanisms. The chairman particularly emphasised the 
importance of the new budgeting procedures and their implementation in the CUC: 
I introduced new procedures for obtaining proposals from the residents. This council calls a 
meeting for each administrative zone to discuss development issues. The community members 
can attend meetings and say what they want the council to do for their area in the next year. 
In this way, we get a long list of projects. As we cannot include all the projects in the budget 
estimates, we ask the participants to prioritise all their proposals by importance. Accordingly, 
the community can decide what should be done first.  
 
Based on our information, the CUC has become one of the first urban councils in the country 
to adhere to the MLGPC’s recommendations of introducing PB. Prior studies drawing on 
Bourdieu’s concepts have illustrated that the accounting techniques such as PB can convert a 
social space into a contested field escalating struggles among social actors for the 
monopolisation of various forms of capital (see e.g. Célérier and Botey, 2015; Farjaudon and 
Morales, 2013; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). The motive of PB in the CUC had 
also been questioned by some members of the opposition parties. During our interviews, an 
opposition leader stated the emergence of PB: 
The PB approach initially came about as a concept of the chairman. He did not inform us 
how he had learnt about it. Someone may have advised him to go from zone to zone with a 
view to discussing issues with people and obtaining their requests for specific infrastructure 
or development projects. This seemed to be his political strategy of increasing his reputation.  
 
The PB practice enabled the chairman to cognise and communicate a logic of participation in 
the CUC and expand the network of connections and relationships (i.e. social capital) with the 
citizens. Disseminating the discourse of participation, PB had also helped him conceal his 
dominant interests, i.e. political continuity and advancement. Initial attempts at introducing 
PB in the CUC, however, remained futile. The logic of domination, which had been 
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internalised by local politicians as the habitus, continued to dictate the logic of participation 
during the PB meetings held in specific zones. The chairman was therefore forced to search 
for and adopt several field-specific strategies in articulating the PB meetings and to secure the 
domination of his political interests. 
 
5.3.PB meetings and the habitus 
 
As part of the PB process, the elected councillors of the CUC were asked to organise at least 
one meeting with the inhabitants in their respective zones between May and June every year. 
The councillors were provided with a clear set of instructions to facilitate the meetings and to 
make heard the voices/concerns of the participants. At the outset, they had to provide the 
participants with a summary of the plan and budget of the council and update them on the 
progress of the ongoing projects within the council. The meetings should have been held 
openly in that the residents could bring up in a discussion any development issues relating to 
their zone and identify the projects that they considered important to be incorporated in the 
council budget. The elected councillors were required to list down the prioritised projects for 
the budget and to forward the list to the chairman and the council for further consideration. 
 
We were told during our interviews that when the meetings were called for the first time, a 
large number of residents, and in some cases even religious leaders, turned out for the 
meetings in all zones. The citizens’ involvement in such meetings gradually declined, 
however, and a degree of dissension was expressed by the attendees of subsequent meetings. 
This happened because the elected members were involved in prioritising projects in the 
budget in accordance with their political preferences, marginalising the voice of the 
community members. The habitus of local politicians developed on the logic of domination in 
fact overshadowed the logic of participation and the elected councillors during the PB 
meetings became ‘dominating’ and took control of the process. As such, there was a decline 
in the level of trust – an integral component of social capital (Putnam, 2000) – between the 
local politicians and community members. An administrative officer clarified this situation: 
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While the meetings with the local community enabled us to obtain the direct views of the 
people, a conflicting situation arose in the second year. People started complaining that the 
elected politicians had included [in the budget] projects that they [the politicians] preferred.  
 
The above quote illustrates that the new way of facilitating the budget meetings provided the 
elected members with a means through which to exercise their symbolic power and 
domination in their field. This was indeed a caveat in the chairman’s attempt to monopolise 
various forms of capital crucial for winning the political game. Bourdieu (1996a) mentions 
that the introduction of field-specific strategies is inevitable when the social actors fail to 
change the structured structure and get access to various types of capital. The chairman 
introduced a new initiative of organising community meetings in the town hall. Prior work in 
the area of public administration has delineated the importance of organising community 
meetings in venues such as town halls, which are not seen as locations of political and 
administrative power, to encourage citizens’ participation (Adams, 2004; Ebdon and Franklin, 
2006; Rossmann and Shanahan, 2012). Based on our interviews, the underlying motive 
behind organising the meetings in the town hall in the CUC, however, was to provide the 
chairman with the opportunity to attend such meetings and to become ‘dominant’ against the 
elected councillors. 
 
Despite these efforts, we were told during our interviews that the turnout at meetings 
continued to be low, signalling a failure of the chairman’s strategy to fulfil his aspiration and 
domination. The chairman introduced another field level strategy of visiting personally the 
specific zones of the council. The visit was meant to encourage the residents of each zone to 
express their concerns collectively regarding the activities that they wanted in their zone and 
give them a say on the projects they wished to be incorporated into the council budget. During 
our interviews, the chairman elucidated the manner in which he attempted to regain the trust 
(social capital) and reputation (symbolic capital) with the residents:  
Due to the low turnout of residents at the town hall, I decided to meet the community in their 
own location and to take on projects that they preferred and needed. People are generally 
more interested to meet the chairman and the elected councillors. By meeting people in their 
communities, I get very close to the public and have become more popular. 
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The above quote manifests that the motive behind such meetings was not only to cognise and 
communicate the logic of participation but also to regain his symbolic capital. To achieve this 
motive, the community meetings were organised and implemented in each zone strategically. 
For instance, the local schools were selected as a site for meeting venues given their capacity 
to accommodate a large number of participants, and a variety of techniques which 
corresponded to the citizens’ dispositions were trialled to draw attention to the meetings. 
Commenting on these techniques, the opposition party leader stated:  
They used two methods to invite people to attend the scheduled meeting. Posters were 
displayed in all public places to notify people about the meeting. Also, a vehicle with 
loudspeakers attached to it was driven around the zone, announcing information such as the 
date, time, and venue of the meeting.  
 
Prior work has shown that endeavours to change the way that local arrangements are made 
and the habitus of citizens tend to pose a threat to the power and position of local politicians 
and are therefore likely to be resisted (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011; Alawattage, 
2011; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001). This was striking in the CUC after the chairman’s attempt 
to dictate and dominate the budget meetings in specific zones. The chairman’s steps were 
considered a threat by the councillors in monopolising various forms of capital in their 
specific zones, in particular symbolic capital gained by being an elected member of the 
community, and the social capital which was built through the establishment of networks and 
trusting relationships with the community members. Alawattage (2011) states that the 
distribution of capital in the field has significant implications for social actors in winning and 
losing the game. The elected councillors were, at the beginning, reluctant to relinquish the 
privilege of deciding on projects, something that could be crucial in catering for their political 
clients’ needs and securing their position in the political field (i.e. in the CUC).  
 
The way that the chairman, being a lawyer, attempted to mitigate this tension and balance the 
power positions (see e.g. Farjaudon and Morales, 2013) between him and the elected 
councillors in the meetings delineates the important role that cultural capital (i.e. knowledge 
and academic qualifications) can play in the political field. As such, the elected members 
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were still asked to lead and take charge of the meetings despite the presence of the chairman 
in the meetings so that they would not feel that they had lost political dominance over their 
administrative zones. Another vital aspect of the chairman’s strategy was to facilitate the 
community meetings more as budget meetings and to deliver a message to the citizens that the 
whole of his administrative staff were concerned about and would be responsive to their 
budgetary needs. A development officer, the accountant, and several other administrators 
were therefore involved in the community meetings. The role of the administrators and 
development officers was to provide assistance to the chairman and the elected councillors in 
explaining to the residents the ongoing events and projects and the plans for the future. The 
accountants were involved in elucidating to the residents the available resources in the budget, 
which could be mobilised to address their concerns. An administrative officer shared his 
experience of the community meetings as follows: 
The chairman, the secretary, the accountant, the internal auditor, a development officer, a 
clerk, and some administrators have been attending the meetings in each administrative zone 
since 2009. At the meetings, residents are informed about what our council has done for the 
development of their zone. We play a video to show them what the present condition of their 
zone is and how the development activities are being financed. In this way we can get them to 
understand the importance of proposing development projects to be included in the budget. 
 
The fact that community-based meetings are dominated by certain groups/people while other 
groups are marginalised is evident in prior studies (Fung, 2006; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; 
Lowndes and Wilson, 2001; Lyon, 2000; Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 2011; Nyamori, 
Lawrence & Perera, 2012). Unlike other cases in which people/groups with higher-status jobs, 
more education, and higher incomes tend to dominate meetings (Gusmano, 2013), the CUC 
seems to have differed in that such people/groups tended to remain silent, while others, in 
particular the followers of political parties, were more active. Driven by a habitus of 
domination and using their social and symbolic capital, the elected members used a 
subversive strategy encouraging their political loyalists to attend the meetings as a group and 
vote for their project. As such the community meetings turned out to be a site for the political 
game in which the politically-oriented and outspoken groups overrode meeting agendas and 
dominated the meetings. This was evident in the following comments made by the opposition 
leader:  
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Because of the community meetings, we are unable to recommend the projects of our 
supporters. Therefore, we advised as many of our people as possible to attend the meeting in 
the zone and vote for projects that the group has proposed. In this way our loyalists can get 
one of their projects as the most preferred one. However, we continued to complain that these 
meetings make us powerless public representatives. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned quote, the dominating political practices that PB had aimed to 
reform had in fact become dominant in articulating the PB meetings in the CUC. This 
dominance of the meetings and budget processes by such politically-motivated groups was 
indeed an impediment to the chairman’s attempt at maintaining and reproducing his social and 
symbolic capital and securing his political interests. Citizens’ motivation and trust to the 
politicians, which is seen as an important element for promoting participation (Musso, Weare, 
Bryer & Cooper, 2011), appeared to have been eroded in the CUC. Attempts to gain a higher 
profile by introducing innovative mechanisms in organising community meetings are evident 
in literature (Bodin and Crona, 2008; Fox, 1996; Shoji, Aoyagi, Kasahara, Sawada & 
Ueyama, 2012; Titeea and Vervisch, 2008). One such strategy that the chairman had pursued 
in order to reinstate his symbolic capital was the inclusion of a team of administrative and 
technical staff in the PB meetings. During the process of budget meetings, those staff 
members spent their time taking immediate remedial action regarding day-to-day recurring 
council issues, such as the replacing of street lamps, the maintenance of the water supply, and 
the addressing of drainage leakages, amongst others, which would otherwise have required 
days or even weeks to resolve. A member of the opposition party commented on this 
endeavour: 
At first, I was sceptical about the participation of technicians in the meeting. I have, however, 
offered my support for organising meetings in this way, as they enable us to find out about the 
things that are not working in a zone as well as the things that people are interested in having 
done in their constituency. 
 
Moreover, additional strategies and measures, for instance, placing newspaper advertisements, 
were taken to elicit the opinions of people who were either absent from the meetings or had 
refrained from expressing their views at them. Having received opinions from these 
marginalised segments of the community, the chairman then made the decision as to which 
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projects should be prioritised in the budget estimates. The next stage was to present the 
budget to the council members who could then propose their own projects that were of 
interest to their parties’ supporters. This was done in order to gain the support of the members 
of council, including the members of opposition parties in budget approval. Exploiting the 
structured habitus of the inhabitants, the logic of dependency and the available capital, in 
particular social and symbolic capital, the chairman was able to tactfully initiate and 
implement the PB process and meetings in a way so as to exert his power and domination in 
the council. The fact that the practice of power and domination (i.e. PB practice) is 
dialectically connected to the conditions (i.e. capital and habitus) that reproduce such a 
practice is evident in prior Bourdieusian work (Alawattage, 2011; Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe, 2011). In the next section we discuss the field-specific organisation of 
various forms of capital in framing the PB practice in the CUC, which, in turn, has 
constructed a condition for the reproduction of capital and the perpetuation of domination and 
symbolic violence in the name of PB. 
 
5.4. Field-specific organisation of capital and the perpetuation of domination and 
symbolic violence 
 
Studies have demonstrated that capital in its different forms when it is implicated in 
calculative practices such as PB provides the social actors with the opportunity and capacity 
to dominate (see e.g. Alawattage, 2011; Hamilton and Ò hÒgartaigh, 2009). The important 
role that the capital had played in structuring the PB meetings and processes and exerting 
domination was evident during our interviews and informal conversations with the 
participants. We were told that several new initiatives in terms of organising and distributing 
various forms of capital had been introduced in the council after the arrival of the chairman.  
 
Bourdieu (1986a; 1986b; 1992a) mentions that economic capital has a key role in ensuring the 
success and survival of politicians in their field. The majority of Sri Lankan local 
governments are, however, lacking this capital. For many years, local governments in the 
country have been solely responsible for generating revenues to cover their day-to-day 
expenses and long-term investments, apart from the salaries of the permanent staff which are 
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funded through the central government funds. This lack of central government grants in 
facilitating day-to-day activities has resulted in huge budget deficits in most of the country’s 
local governments, and the CUC was no exception to this trend. In the past, as is the case of 
other councils (Kulasekera, 1989), one reason escalating budget deficits in the CUC had been 
the problem in collecting rates. Albeit it was explicitly mentioned in the central government 
regulations that the management of the funds and revenues of local governments should be a 
joint responsibility of the politicians and the administrators, local politicians were reluctant to 
force people to pay their incurred rates (Local Government Circular No. 3 of 2005; Slater 
1997). The elected councillors were more concerned with their position in the political field 
(ward) and that maintaining social and symbolic capital was of utmost important to them to 
perpetuate their political career. In the interviews, there was a belief expressed among the 
politicians that the task of collecting rates should be the responsibility of the administrators 
given that they are not elected and are therefore not required to be accountable to the citizens. 
This is evident in the following statements made by an elected member: 
I am an elected member. It is my obligation to serve my constituency and I can do this by 
offering the citizens as many services as possible. I have nothing to do with the shortfall in 
rates collection. 
 
As such, almost 2,000 out of 4,000 property holders in the council did not pay rates at all. 
However, the majority of the administrators we interviewed conceded the fact that the 
chairman’s attempt to include them in the PB meetings with the elected councillors had to a 
large extent helped them redress the problem of rates collection and generate additional 
revenues for the council. For instance, they had the opportunity to talk to residents personally 
during the budget meetings and make them aware of the importance of paying rates and the 
possible consequences of breaching the council regulations. This access to communication 
further contributed to a level of trust and connectedness being built up between the 
administrators and the local residents, so that the administrators were able to visit residents’ 
homes to collect rates, and offer them additional time to pay them. The importance of such 
public meetings for improving the governmental and administrative responsiveness to citizens 
is also evident in prior studies (Adams, 2004; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). These activities 
together reportedly enabled the council administrators to collect approximately 2.6 million 
rupees in overdue rates in 2012.  
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Another initiative that the chairman pursued to elevate the economic viability of the council 
was the outsourcing or contracting out of some of the council’s responsibilities to the private 
sector. For instance, the responsibility for maintaining the town’s central bus station was 
handed over to an advertising agency. In a similar vein, the sports clubs in the administrative 
area of the CUC were authorised to manage and renovate the council’s sports facilities and 
infrastructure, such as swimming pools, cricket grounds, and indoor stadiums. A member of 
the accounting staff explained how the transfer of such responsibilities helped the council 
generate additional revenues:  
It costs approximately 5 million rupees to paint the central bus station. The council cannot 
afford to do this every other year. Even if we are able to rent out some space to display 
advertisements, the revenue is simply not enough to cover the maintenance and security 
expenses. As a result of these new arrangements, it is now renovated every other year by an 
advertising firm. 
 
The chairman was therefore in a position to distribute a small portion of revenues, i.e. what 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) have termed ‘the means of appropriation of surplus value’, 
during the PB meetings to activities/events that were of interest to the wider community and 
crucial in enabling him to get acquainted with community members. Such activities, which 
were central to promoting social capital (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1986b; 1996b; Chenhall, Hall & 
Smith, 2010; Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 2011; Putnam, 2000), include the Sinhalese 
New Year festival, a book donation ceremony, an annual sports competition, and an award 
ceremony for Sunday schools for Buddhist studies. Also, a football coach had been provided 
for the town’s football club, his salary coming from the council’s budget. Emphasising the 
importance of these council activities, the chairman stated: 
All these events that are being held by the council at present are new initiatives. Despite the 
budget deficit, we organise these events annually because they will help community members 
to develop a sense of belonging to the community. 
 
The social capital-based literature has emphasised that concerns over political survival lead 
politicians to search for opportunities to establish cordial relationships with a variety of 
groups in the field other than party followers and residents (Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 
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2011; Putnam, 2000). This was also evident in the CUC. The chairman had a particular focus 
to extend his network of social ties, i.e. social capital (Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2010), with 
different groups, for instance, NGOs resulted in a range of institutional arrangements, 
contributing to the creation of cultural capital and its use in the PB process. For instance, the 
administrators we interviewed revealed how one NGO had sponsored the CUC to organise a 
workshop to discuss administrators’ response times to residents’ complaints or service 
requests, and to enhance the effectiveness of service delivery mechanisms. In a similar vein, 
another NGO had sponsored a trip to the Philippines so that council representatives could 
study how local governments there organised their day-to-day activities. The CUC’s holding 
of discussions with traders’ associations prior to issuing trade licences for short-term trading 
campaigns was pinpointed during our interviews as one initiative that the council had initiated 
based on that visit. Commenting on the use of cultural capital, the chairman stated: 
Let us assume that we intend to offer a trade licence for a week for the promotion of a 
particular company’s product. In this situation, we first investigate whether a member of the 
Merchants’ Union is selling the same product in our town. If it is doing so, we impose the 
condition that the company applying for the licence gets involved with the merchant who is 
already selling the product. This increases the income of our traders. We learnt this during 
our visit to the municipality of the city of Naga in the Philippines. 
 
There is also evidence that several associations, for instance, the Association of Trishaw 
Drivers and the Fishermen’s Association, had been set up in the council to cognise and 
communicate a sense of solidarity and courtesy between people sharing common values. 
Wijeweera (1989) states that the Sri Lankan local governments have been known to be a 
heaven for kickbacks receivers, particularly with respect to approving the construction of 
public utilities. The chairman’s endeavours to instigate open tenders for construction projects 
embedded in the budget at the council’s monthly meeting became another factor helping him 
to propagate corruption-free governance in the council and renew his image as a democratic 
grassroots leader (i.e. symbolic capital).  This new tender process was different from the 
prevailing practice of many local governments, in which a tender committee, chaired by the 
chairman, was usually assigned the responsibility for awarding contracts to the most suitable 
constructors, having scrutinised their proposals. Commenting on this process of selecting 
contractors for the projects included in the budget, an administrator at the CUC stated: 
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Awarding tenders is a task that provokes criticism from the members of the house if we use a 
tender committee to perform it. The chairman has therefore decided to bring up the topic of 
suitable contractors at the council’s monthly meetings. All the members are aware that the 
tenders will be opened at the meeting and they can observe who is awarded them and why.  
 
Apparently, the chairman’s attempt to interact and establish social relationships, however, 
was not confined to the supporters and residents but also incorporated competing individuals, 
for instance, opposition party members. He reached out to the elected councillors of the 
opposition parties by making room for their prioritised projects in the budget in the council’s 
budget meetings. This effort by the chairman had seemingly been successful in terms of 
establishing a connection, i.e. bridging social capital, with a small cadre of the opposition 
parties, easing the process of budget discussion and approval in the council. As stated by 
Alawattage (2011), the PB practice had in this way functioned in the CUC as an instrument of 
domination or as an instrument that legitimated domination. One opposition party member 
conceded during our conversation: 
Although I represent the UNP, I can ask the chairman to implement my project ideas. He does 
not ignore such requests. I know that he is aiming to boost his popularity via this new 
budgeting approach. However, we can get our project proposals implemented as well. 
 
Bourdieu (1986a, 1986b) states that one form of capital can be converted to another form and 
this process of convergence provides a condition for the reproduction of various other forms 
of capital, disposition, and domination. Similar to this view, the economic and social capital 
which the chairman had accumulated provided him with a condition for the reproduction and 
redistribution of cultural, social, and symbolic capital. The PB meetings acted as a conduit in 
this process of transforming one form of capital into another. For instance, the social capital 
provided a condition for the reproduction of cultural capital in that the administrators 
embodied new approaches to collecting rates more effectively by visiting the citizens. The 
redistribution of economic capital in social and cultural events provided the chairman with the 
opportunity to invent himself as a grassroots leader (symbolic capital). We argue that it was 
due to such field-specific accumulation, reproduction, and redistribution of various forms of 
capital that allowed the chairman to frame PB in a way so as to exercise his dominance and 
symbolic violence in the council. As stated in the extensive Bourdieusian-based studies (e.g. 
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Cooper, Coulson & Taylor, 2011; Everett, 2003; Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998; 
Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011), the PB practice had exerted symbolic violence in that 
those members of opposition parties who were subjected to it accepted its rationales and were 
instead involved in legitimising the practice. There was an agenda underlying the PB practice, 
i.e. ascending the upper echelons in local politics (i.e. provincial level), which the chairman 
attempted to pursue and perpetuate through the use of a calculative practice such as PB (see 
e.g. Cooper, Coulson & Taylor, 2011, 2011). 
 
Despite the underpinning of citizens and a few members of the opposition parties, the field-
specific organisation of capital implicated in the PB practice was not without controversy in 
the council. Claims were made during our interviews that the manner in which the chairman 
prioritised and incorporated the projects of opposition party members in the budget were 
biased, promoting a degree of favouritism and patronisation. Many opposition party members 
also alleged that by launching the populists’ programmes/arrangements in the name of 
articulating PB, the chairman strove to harm their image (symbolic capital) and position in the 
political field rather than to genuinely enhance political emancipation. A council 
representative from the opposition party commented during our interviews: 
We have spent time and a significant amount of money in order to be public figures of the 
council. However, the chairman has been able to tactfully reduce our privileges and image in 
the council by promoting populist programmes and excluding us from the day-to-day 
business. We should be given due respect for being elected. 
 
The way the chairman had redistributed various forms of capital, in particular surplus values 
(economic capital), to facilitate social, religious, and sports activities in the council, which 
were vital for reaching a large segment of community members and maintaining social 
connectedness with them, was particularly seen by the opponents as a threat not only to their 
political survival but also to the long-term sustainability of the council. Commenting on the 
potential threat, the opposition leader stated: 
The chairman spent 1 million rupees celebrating World Children Day with nursery school 
children. As he was intending to contest the provincial council election, he invited parents 
and children to the ceremony from beyond the administrative area of this council. He has 
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made himself popular by exploiting the council’s resources. I have stated several times that 
this council will not survive if he continues to manage its revenues this way. 
 
The chairman’s popularity was clearly manifested at the council’s last election held in 2011. 
He managed to secure the highest number of votes whilst arguably spending almost ten times 
less money than other grassroots politicians. The chairman justified the results as follows: 
Thanks to the new budgeting process, I am politically secure. Although I was not endorsed 
and promoted by the chief minister of our province, the community voted for me. The chief 
minister was campaigning for other candidates, but I was the number one in terms of the 
community’s preference. I only spent about 200,000 rupees, whilst other candidates used up 
to 2 million rupees on the election campaign.  
 
The above quote is evidence that there was increasing tension between the chairman and the 
chief minister of the province, although both represented the SLFP from the same 
constituency. This illustrates how the underlying dynamics of power, domination, and 
violence implicated in the PB practice has played a crucial role in the politics of the CUC. 
The chairman’s success in the field-specific organisation of various forms of capital had 
contributed him to maintaining political domination in the grassroots politics consistently 
since 2006. Nevertheless, the political rift with the chief minister, along with the enactment of 
a new act that had curtailed the executive power of the local authorities’ political leadership, 
compelled the chairman to suspend the PB process in 2013. During our interviews, however, 
the chairman mentioned that he was determined to introduce PB again before the upcoming 
local government elections in 2015.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions  
 
We have in this paper demonstrated the PB process in one Sri Lankan urban council (i.e. the 
CUC). PB has been a key component of neo-liberal reforms such as NPM and NPG. It is 
reckoned by international organisations to be the best accounting practice for emerging and 
LDCs (Cèlèrier and Botey, 2015). Although a large number of LDCs, particularly in Latin 
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America, have in recent years attempted to incorporate the PB practice in their local 
governments, its propagated merits in providing space to marginalised groups of a society in 
the decision-making process and its emancipation potential in democratisation have been 
contested (Speer, 2012). Our study of the PB practice in the CUC is an illustration in this 
regard. Despite its partial success in fostering cultural capital (Chenhall, Hall & Smith, 2010), 
PB as a practice has seemingly failed to achieve its fundamental objective – strengthening 
grassroots democracy and fostering political emancipation. 
 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s triad, i.e. field, habitus and capital, we have striven to tease out the 
real practice in the CUC in the name of PB in detail, paying attention to the political and 
cultural peculiarities in such practices. Our main contribution lies in the fact that we have 
empirically illustrated the potential of PB to become a practice of power, domination, and 
symbolic violence rather than a democratic innovation for citizen participation in the political 
process and political emancipation (Fung, 2006; Nyamori, Lawrence & Perera, 2012; Musso, 
Weare, Bryer & Cooper, 2011; Célérier and Botey, 2015). As stated by Bourdieu (1996b), the 
CUC has appeared to be a vibrant battlefield for the two major parties of the country, i.e. the 
Unite National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), to maintain their 
political position since the 1970s. The budget functioned as a tool for local politicians to 
achieve this goal and to continue to exert their domination. Resources were allocated and the 
projects and programmes selected and prioritised in each zone so as to meet the requirements 
of the party loyalists and to strengthen the patron-client relationship. The logic of domination 
underlying the budget was the doxa (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1992b; 1993a; 1993b; Cèlèrier and 
Botey, 2015)  and the reproduction of dominant budget routines had become the taken-for-
granted habitus. Hamilton and Ò hÒgartaigh (2009) state that patterns of practice originating 
in one habitus do not easily transfer to another. The structured structures that have evolved 
through past experience are particularly influencing actors’ behaviour and practices in a social 
space (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986a; 1992b; 1993a; 1996a). The PB meetings held in the CUC is 
evidence in this regard. The logic of domination continued to perpetuate in the CUC 
undermining the logic of participation during the PB meetings organised in different zones, as 
the meetings were dominated by a set of particular politically-active groups prohibiting wider 
community participation. The elected councillors who had a feeling for the game (Bourdieu, 
1990; 1992a; 1993a) executed a subversive strategy encouraging such groups and their 
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political loyalists to override the meetings and, in so doing, channelled the resources into the 
areas of their interests. 
 
An interesting aspect of our study is however the manner in which the chairman became 
dominant by implicating field-specific properties of habitus and capital in PB and took control 
of the whole PB process. The field-specific strategies that the chairman had adopted such as 
organising the budget meetings in specific zones, for instance, town halls and schools; making 
a personal visit to specific zones; attending the PB meetings with a team of administrators and 
technicians, and taking immediate remedial actions with the help of these technicians in day-
to-day activities (for instance, the replacing of street lamps); placing newspaper 
advertisements to elicit the opinions of the marginalised segments; and allowing the elected 
councillors to lead the meetings in their specific zones so as to balance a power relation with 
them were all meant to reinstate his domination in each zone. In addition, the exertion of 
symbolic violence was evident in his attempts at incorporating the projects and programmes 
prioritised by the elected councillors of opposition parties. Some members of opposition 
parties, who were actually subjected to such domination and violence imposed through PB, 
had the illusio (Bourdieu, 1992b; 1996b; Cèlèrier and Botey, 2015; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992) that they were pursuing their own interests (projects) in the budget. The budget game 
appeared to them one worth being played (Bourdieu, 1996b) in that they refrained themselves 
from voting against the budget, legitimating the PB practice and contributing to the chairman 
strengthening his power position in the council.  
 
Social actors’ position and power in a particular space is mainly dependent on the field-
specific capital that can be mobilised (Bourdieu, 1986a; Alawattage, 2011; Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe, 2011). Capital in its various forms has been defined as a structural and 
relational condition that underlies the way in which the dominant practices such as PB 
evolves (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1986b; Swartz, 1997). Studies have however illustrated that capital 
is not just a teleological and unidirectional outcome of practice but a condition of, and which 
is dialectically related to, the practice (Alawattage, 2011; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 
2011; Xu and Xu, 2008). Such a subtle dialectical connection between the PB meetings and 
practice and the conditions that reproduce the domination in the name of PB was evident in 
the CUC. For instance, being a lawyer and an elected leader, the chairman, as stated by 
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Cooper, Coulson & Taylor (2011), already had both the power of and over various forms of 
capital, for instance, cultural, symbolic, and social capital. Mobilising the cultural and 
symbolic capital, the chairman was able to introduce new procedures in rates collection 
during the PB meetings and reinforce a social tie between the citizens and administration. 
Social and symbolic capitals were apparently dominant in terms of allowing the chairman to 
establish cooperation and relationships with the private sector, NGOs, and citizens’ 
associations. The cooperation with the private sector led to an outsourcing of some of the 
public services offered by the council, for instance, sport activities. This provided the 
chairman with the opportunity to engender a surplus value (see e.g. Alawattage, 2011) which 
he could utilise in facilitating social events such as New Year celebrations and book donation 
ceremony amongst others that  are crucial for strengthening his symbolic and social capital. 
The cooperation with NGOs had an implication in enhancing the competence and skills of 
administrators, which contributed to introducing new procedures in delivering services to 
inhabitants, for instance, issuing trade licences, and tender-offering procedures in the CUC.  
 
Our study has in this way delineated how the possession of capital in its various forms has 
enabled the chairman to structure the PB meetings in a way so as to cognise and communicate 
his image as a democratic leader at the grassroots level. In addition, the chairman was able to 
articulate one form of capital or the composition of various types of capital to reinvent and 
redistribute another form of capital and extend his domination and symbolic violence in day-
to-day work practices. His success in establishing a monopoly over the means of capital 
creation and accumulation, and creating power asymmetries and inequalities, was evident in 
the local election. The chairman won the election despite the disagreement with the provincial 
political leadership, who was in fact representing the same political party, and by incurring 
much less expenditure than the other candidates. The PB practice, which is actually meant to 
alleviate dominating political practice, has instead become dominated by the same political 
dynamics that it aims to reform in the CUC. On this basis, we argue that accounting practices 
such as the PB practice may not be able to produce intended results in the political field of 
LDCs (the CUC being one example) due to the existence of a political culture in which the 
politicians lean to pursue self-aggrandisement and political dominance. As such, we have seen 
that the dominant individuals usually do not adopt accounting practices that impede their 
ability to exercise symbolic violence. Instead, they tend to rely on subversive strategies that 
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strengthen their position or at least help them sustain their existing dominant position (see e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1992a; 1992b; Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011).  
 
To sum up, our study of the PB practice in the CUC is evidence that the fate and careers of the 
politicians/social actors in the field of LDCs are very much dependent on their ability to 
accumulate and distribute various forms of capital. The motives behind the PB practice could 
therefore involve far more than simply revitalising local democracy, and extend to achieving 
personal gains, in particular, securing one’s position in the field. The practice of PB can be a 
symbolic means of monopolising power and exerting domination and symbolic violence. It 
appears to us that the popularity that the chairman of the CUC has gained through the PB 
practice has made it rather difficult, if not impossible, for opposition parties to oust him 
through an election. Considering the way the PB practice has been articulated in the CUC, 
concerns can be raised as to whether PB could be more a caveat rather than fostering political 
emancipation. Doubts can therefore be expressed as to whether the symbolic system such as 
PB in the context of LDCs could lead to a condition for the emergence of tyranny instead of 
being a means for reinventing local democracy, as proposed by the World Bank, the USAID, 
and other international organisations.  
 
The fact that our findings are drawn from a single case study (i.e. the CUC), however, means 
that further studies are needed to answer such questions and to further elaborate on our 
understanding of the dynamics between accounting practices, democracy, and the political 
game in LDCs. It is equally important to accommodate the views of local residents regarding 
the significance of PB, which are missing in this study, in promoting social ties and 
improving local governance. The studies by Musso, Weare, Bryer & Cooper (2011), Cèlèrier 
and Botey (2015), and Nyamori, Lawrence & Perera (2012) have pointed out the importance 
of embracing the views of local residents in order to develop a broader understanding of local 
government reform processes. Further studies including local residents’ opinions of PB could 
therefore provide additional insights into the subtle dialectic relationship between accounting 
practices and the conditions (i.e. habitus and capital) that reproduce such practices. 
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Appendix A: Phases of field visit and interviewees   
Interviewee  1st round 2nd round 3rd round 4thround Total  
Three times  
Chairman         01      01     01    03 
Accounting Officer        01      01     01    03 
Development Assistants    01      01     01    03 
Revenue Officers        02      02     02    06 
Bookkeeping Staff        01      01     01    03 
Two times 
Secretary        01      01      02 
Internal Auditor        01      01      02 
Development Assistant     01       01    02 
Bookkeeping Staff       01       01    02 
One time 
Vice Chairman         01      01 
Elected Members       01      02      03 
Opposition Leader          01  01 
Total         11      11     08     01  31 
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Appendix B: Phases of data collection and authors’ involvement 
  Phase-1 Phase-2 Phase-3 Phase-4 
  Author-1   Author-1 Author-1 
    Author-3 Author-3  
      Author-4 Author-4 
        Author-5 
    Author-6 Author-6    
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